In this paper, we consider the pricing e¤ects of noisy risk disclosure. We show that uncertainty over the riskiness of a …rm's cash ‡ows is priced and that risk disclosure decreases the cost of capital in both single and multi-asset settings. We …nd that mean and risk disclosure are substitutes, and that …rms acquire and disclose more risk information when they discover that risks are high.
Introduction
In the wake of the recent …nancial crisis, regulatory authorities are increasing the pressure on …rms to disclose information about the riskiness of their cash ‡ows. For example, the SEC approved rules that require …rms to issue disclosures on compensation practices that could lead employees to take on excessive risks in 2009. Moreover, the FASB proposed an accounting standards update (Topic 285) in 2010. This update would require …rms to disclose information about liquidity and interest rate risks, stating "users of …nancial statements overwhelmingly indicated that [. . . ] understanding a reporting entity's exposures to risks that are inherent in …nancial instruments and the ways in which reporting entities manage these risks is integral to making informed decisions about capital allocation". 1 For there to be any value in the disclosure of information regarding risks it has to be the case that investors are uncertain of the riskiness of …rms'cash ‡ows. Generally, however, the existing theoretical literature assumes that the riskiness of cash ‡ows is known, and focuses on the e¤ects of disclosure regarding expected cash ‡ows. 2 In this paper, we relax this assumption and analyze the capital market e¤ects of risk disclosure.
In our model, investors are uncertain about the variance of a …rm's cash ‡ows. Before trading in the …rm's shares, the …rm discloses a noisy report about its risks and investors update their beliefs. To our knowledge, we are the …rst to provide a model of imperfect risk disclosures. The most similar study to ours is Jørgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) which focuses on the discretionary disclosure of a perfect revelation of the variance. Jørgensen and Kirschenheiter …nd that mandatory disclosure requirements will increase …rms' expected betas, as it forces some …rms to suboptimally incur a disclosure cost.
We build our model around common assumptions in the disclosure literature; cash ‡ows follow a normal distribution and investors maximize a negative exponential utility function. 1 More recently, the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force issued an extensive report recommending several improvements in the risk disclosure of banks, claiming that "investors and other public stakeholders are demanding better access to risk information from banks; information that is more transparent, timely and comparable across institutions. Within this framework, we investigate cost of capital implications of the imperfect risk disclosure and highlight costs and bene…ts to mandatory risk disclosure requirements. Along the lines of Gron, Jørgensen, and Polson (2011) we …rst show that when price is endogenously derived from trade between investors with negative exponential utility functions, there is a "variance uncertainty" premium for dispersion in variance in addition to the standard risk premium. The intuition driving this result is that variance uncertainty creates "fat tails"in the distribution of cash ‡ows. The disutility investors experience from risk increases at an increasing rate, analogous to the standard concavity result for the mean of cash ‡ows. As a result, these investors are averse to "fat tailed" distributions. In the economics literature that studies risk attitudes, such an aversion is referred to as temperance (e.g., Crainich, Eeckhoudt, and Trannoy, 2013) . This suggests that risk disclosure may reduce the cost of capital and provides an economic rationale for the FASB's statement that understanding a …rm's riskiness is critical to e¢ cient capital allocation. To investigate further, we derive a closed form expression for prices assuming a gamma distributed variance, and …nd that prices are a function of the mean of cash ‡ows, the mean of the variance of cash ‡ows, and the variance of the variance of cash ‡ows.
We next investigate how price reacts to noisy signals of the variance, and …nd results that carry much of the intuition from the prior literature on mean-based disclosures. In particular, more precise signals receive greater weight, and signals receive greater weight when investors are more risk averse. Variance signals always reduce the variance uncertainty premium that investors place on the …rm, since investors' perceived distribution over the variance narrows. However, the net e¤ect on share price will depend on the realization of the variance signal, since, for example, a very high signal will increase investors'perception of the mean of the variance distribution. This is analogous to the classical result that meanbased signals reduce the risk premium that investors apply, but these signals'total e¤ect on price depends on their realization relative to the market's prior.
From an ex ante perspective, risk disclosures reduce the variance uncertainty premium that investors impose on the …rm, but have no impact on the risk premium (since the cash ‡ow risk itself does not change in expectation). This implies that …rms can reduce their cost of capital by making a commitment to disclose information concerning cash ‡ow variance. Thus, we o¤er theoretical evidence in support of the Enhanced Disclosure Taskforce's statement that "by enhancing investors'understanding of banks'risk exposures and risk management practices, high-quality risk disclosures may reduce uncertainty premiums and contribute to broader …nancial stability."We perform comparative statics on this cost of capital reduction, and show that it increases in the prior uncertainty over the variance, investors'risk aversion, and the prior mean of the variance distribution.
Outside of Jørgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) we are not aware of any theoretical work that examines the capital markets e¤ects of risk disclosure. However, a subset of the accounting literature has considered the impact of disclosure about expected cash ‡ows when investors face uncertainty over the variance of cash ‡ows (Beyer 2009) with uncertain precisions and typically models information as true cash ‡ows plus a noise term. Therefore, the disclosed report resembles an earnings announcement or the realization of historical cash ‡ows. Investors in these models are able to use noisy signals of cash ‡ows to indirectly update on the variance of cash ‡ows or the precision of the …rm's signal. In particular, when a …rm discloses a signal that substantially deviates from the market's prior, investors infer that the variance of cash ‡ows is high. Furthermore, the prior disclosure literature on uncertainty over the variance of cash ‡ows or precision of …rms' information exogenously speci…es that prices are linear in the mean and/or in the expected variance of cash ‡ows. 3 This assumption implies that the uncertainty over variances cannot have an 3 See, for example, Beyer (2009), Hughes and Pae (2004) , Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2001) , Penno (1995) , and Subramanyam (1995) . Modeling variance disclosure as a direct signal regarding the variance demands a suitable nonnegative distribution for the variance, a conjugate prior for that distribution, and a utility function that yields a closed form solution with these distributions. Therefore, we believe that prior literature has assumed risk neutral or mean variance pricing for tractability purposes. While this is suitable for the settings these papers examine, our focus is on the pricing of variance uncertainty and the e¤ect of impact on price. We argue that disclosures of this type do not capture the direct disclosure of risks that regulators and investors demand.
Recent empirical work examines the information content of risk disclosure in …rms'10-K …lings (for example, Bao and Datta 2014; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele 2014; and Hope, Hu, and Lu 2014). Our paper o¤ers a theoretical rationale for the existing …ndings that prices respond to risk disclosure. Furthermore, we predict that prices react more strongly to risk disclosure when prior uncertainty is high and that …rms with greater uncertainty over the variance have increased incentives to disclose variance information. Our model also predicts that …rms which commit to disclose information regarding their risks earn returns closer to the risk free rate, ceteris paribus. Campbell et al. (2014) o¤ers empirical evidence for this result, …nding that risk disclosure is associated with greater …rm value.
We extend our study of risk disclosure to more general settings in order to generate additional empirical predictions regarding the value of risk disclosure and to better understand the role of regulation. First, we consider the interaction between disclosures regarding the mean and the variance. Our model suggests that mean and variance disclosures are substitutes. This suggests that regulations which mandate variance disclosure may have the unintended consequence of reducing voluntary mean disclosure. In a second application, we consider a setting where the …rm sequentially acquires information regarding its risks. The …rm can …rst learn and disclose one piece of variance information, and, based on that information, choose whether to continue information acquisition and disclosure. This process continues until the …rm no longer wishes to acquire additional information. We show that in this setting, …rms expend greater e¤ort on learning when they receive bad, i.e., high variance, news. This implies that …rms'…nancial statements will contain more information on risks when their cash ‡ows are more risky. This is distinct from the result that greater prior uncertainty over the variance leads to more disclosure, and is a key di¤erence between our results and those for mean-based disclosure with normal distributions. In line with our risk disclosures. predictions, Campbell et al. (2014) and Hope et al. (2014) …nd that …rms with greater risks disclose more risk information in their 10-K's. Finally, we consider a multi-asset market. In this model, we show that prices continue to contain an additional risk premium for variance uncertainty over the common factor; however, the variance uncertainty premium for idiosyncratic risk vanishes as the economy grows large. We show that in order for disclosure to impact the cost of capital in this setting, it must contain information on systematic risk.
Moreover, when disclosure contains information regarding the common risk factor, it reduces the risk discount of all …rms and thus has positive externalities.
Our model is related to the literature on ambiguity aversion, which investigates uncertainty over the distribution of cash ‡ows. A common assumption in this literature is that investors apply a discount to the expected cash ‡ows either by operating under the most pessimistic distribution from a speci…ed set of possible distributions (see Garlappi what drives the discount and show that the discount may be reduced through risk disclosure.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on estimation risk (Barry and Brown 1985; and Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay 1995). Barry and Brown (1985) examines the di¤erence in betas that results when investors must estimate the mean and covariance matrix of returns.
They …nd that betas are higher for …rms with greater variance uncertainty. Barry and Brown (1985) does not directly model price formation, but rather assumes that returns are exogenous and that beta is the metric of importance when evaluating the e¤ect of variance uncertainty. On the contrary, our multiasset model shows that beta alone is not su¢ cient to capture the e¤ects of variance uncertainty on prices. Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay (1995) show that the CAPM does not hold in its traditional form when investors face estimation risk over the mean and variance of cash ‡ows. Coles et al. (1995) assumes that an investor's expected utility is increasing in the mean and decreasing in the variance of cash ‡ows, which, again, implies that uncertainty over the variance is not priced.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our core model, deriving prices under variance uncertainty, price responses to disclosure, and the e¤ect of an ex ante commitment to disclosure on the cost of capital. Section 3 considers the interaction between mean and variance disclosure. Section 4 considers sequential learning and disclosure and highlights a key di¤erence between our model and standard mean-based models of disclosure. Section 5 extends the single asset model to a multiple asset setting.
A Single Asset Model

Pricing
We consider a single period economy with two assets: a riskless asset with a price of 1, and a risky asset with a per-share price of P . There is a continuum of homogeneous risk-averse investors in the economy who have negative exponential utility, u = exp [ w], with risk aversion parameter and terminal wealth w. The riskless bond has an unlimited supply while we normalize the per capita supply of the risky asset to 1. Conditional on the variance, the per-share payo¤ to the risky asset,x, is normally distributed with mean and varianceṼ . 4 The distributional assumptions in our model di¤er from much of the prior literature on disclosure in that we assume thatṼ is unknown to investors and follows a gamma In the main text, we parameterize the gamma distribution by its mean and variance in order to provide better intuition for our comparative statics. In particular, we assume thatṼ has the following 4 We denote random variables with a tilde "~". density function:
It is easily checked that E Ṽ = V and V ar Ṽ = 2 V . 5 We assume a gamma distribution for the variance as it has been widely used in the statistics literature. 6 Furthermore, as we will show, the gamma distribution yields a closed form solution for prices when combined with negative exponential utility.
Our assumption of an uncertain variance implies that the unconditional distribution of cash ‡ows exhibits excess kurtosis (or "fat tails") relative to a normal distribution with a known variance. 7 This can be seen by computing excess kurtosis, de…ned as the fourth standardized moment minus 3 (where 3 is the kurtosis of a normal distribution):
This implies that the probability that cash ‡ows take on extreme values is greater when uncertainty about the variance exists. Figure 1 compares a normal distribution with uncertain, gamma distributed variance to a normal distribution with known variance.
The intuition for many of our results is as follows: investors with negative exponential utility apply a discount to cash ‡ow distributions that exhibit kurtosis as they have a distaste for extremely bad outcomes. This is generally true for utility functions that have a negative 4 th derivative (for example, power utility), or, in other words, utility functions The economics 5 Characterizing the gamma distribution by its mean and variance creates the following restriction: V = 0 () 2 V = 0: This occurs because a zero mean implies the distribution is degenerate at zero. 6 The inverse gamma is widely used as a conjugate prior for the variance of a normal distribution when signals are drawn from a normal-gamma distribution (see DeGroot 1970) . We choose to examine the gamma distribution rather than the inverse gamma distribution as the moment generating function for an inverse gamma does not exist. 7 While the fat tails that follow from the uncertain variance seemingly map to the empirical …ndings in Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) , those studies suggest that stock returns exhibit fat tails whereas our result implies that cash ‡ows themselves exhibit fat tails. literature on risk preferences refers to agents with such utility functions as "temperate"and refer to the negative ratio of the 4 th and 3 rd derivative, u 0000 (x) =u 000 (x), as the coe¢ cient of absolute temperance. 8 Note that we assume investors maximize a negative exponential utility where the coe¢ cient of absolute temperance equals the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Given that variance disclosure reduces the variance uncertainty, it also reduces the excess kurtosis (i.e., the fat tails phenomenon in …gure 1), and, thus, the discount that investors apply.
We begin by deriving prices in the absence of disclosure. Several prior papers that feature uncertainty over the second moment have assumed either risk neutral or mean-variance utility general characterization of aversion to variance uncertainty). This is true for an arbitrary distribution of the variance and is a result of the preferences for temperance. In the appendix, we show that an investor's certainty equivalents given demand D reduces to the following:
Note that Jensen's inequality implies that ln E e
vestor's certainty equivalent is reduced when a mean preserving spread is applied to the variance. As a result, we should expect to …nd that prices decrease as uncertainty over the variance increases. Essentially, the reason for this result is that each additional point of variance becomes increasingly painful to an investor, as her expected utility is concave in the variance. 9 Hence, investors are averse to greater kurtosis or, temperate.
In order to provide the market clearing price, we have to assume that
nically, this condition is necessary because the gamma distribution is only de…ned over non-negative values. 10 Furthermore, the condition prevents a situation where investors have in…nite negative utility when they hold their share of the per capita endowment; if the condition did not hold, no price would allow for the market to clear. 11 Proposition 1 shows that the concavity with respect to variance in the the investors'leads to an uncertainty premium in price.
The …rm's price can be expressed as:
where
and
9 It is easily seen that
< 0. 10 The Gamma distribution with shape parameter a and a scale parameter b is only de…ned for a > 0 and b > 0. After developing an investor's certainty equivalent, we need b > has to hold. That is, the scale parameter has to be su¢ ciently large or the equilibrium demand (that is, the shares per capita) need to be su¢ ciently small. We derive an investor's certainty equivalent with the standard parameterization in the proof to Proposition 1.
11 If the per capita endowment were an arbitrary constant e rather than 1; the condition would become 2 e 2 < 2
: See the appendix for more details.
The price function in Proposition (1) reduces to the expected cash ‡ow minus the standard risk premium minus an additional term for uncertainty over the variance which we label the "variance uncertainty premium"or VUP 0 . We de…ne the "total risk premium"as the sum of the risk premium and the variance uncertainty premium. Note that the variance uncertainty premium equals the risk premium multiplied by an in ‡ation factor that is related to the excess kurtosis of the cash ‡ow distribution. When there is no risk in the asset, i.e., V = 0, which implies 2 V = 0, both the risk premium and the variance uncertainty premium vanish, and prices are equal to the mean. When there is no excess kurtosis in the asset, the variance uncertainty premium reduces to zero but the risk premium remains.
The in ‡ation factor is increasing and convex in risk aversion and is, V is not a simple location parameter as it is for normal distributions, and thus does not uniformly reduce the investor's valuation of the distribution. 12 On the other hand, as we show in part (iv), a location shift of the formṼ 0 =Ṽ + k, for k > 0, strictly reduces prices as it only impacts the risk premium; this occurs because the location shift increases the distribution ofṼ in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance.
To understand more generally how prices respond to shifts in the distribution, consider changes in the variance distribution in the sense of …rst and second order stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD respectively). We should expect that distributional shifts inṼ in the sense of FSD reduce price, and distributional shifts inṼ in the sense of SSD increase price. Ali (1975) derives the following necessary and su¢ cient conditions for …rst and second order stochastic dominance for the gamma distribution characterized by shape and rate a and b:
2 when a 1 a 2 and b 1 b 2 with one equality strict; (7)
Expressing prices in terms of a and b, we …nd:
A shift in the distribution ofṼ in the sense of FSD involves either increasing a or decreasing b; in either case, price falls. A shift in the distribution ofṼ in the sense of SSD is achieved 12 Increases in the mean holding the variance …xed reduce the degree of positive skew in the distribution. 13 Note that Ali (1975) refers to the shape parameter as and to the rate parameter as whereas we refer to them as a and b, respectively. In particular, here and in the appendix we refer to a gamma distribution with PDF
.
by either increasing b and increasing a by at least the same percentage, or by decreasing b and weakly increasing a. In either case, price increases as expected. 14 Our results imply that empirically, both assets with higher variance and assets with more uncertainty about their variance should earn higher returns. This can act as a correlated omitted variable in empirical studies that consider the pricing of information. In the next section, we analyze how prices react to information announcements regarding their variance.
Risk Disclosure
This section introduces noisy disclosures of risk. Within this setting we derive the response coe¢ cient to risk disclosure as an equivalent to the earnings response coe¢ cient in the prior disclosure literature. The …rm's price in eqn. (4) suggests that a disclosure of the …rm's variance of cash ‡ows a¤ects price. To keep prices before and after the disclosure comparable the disclosure requires a likelihood function which has the gamma distribution as a conjugate prior such that prices before and after the signal have the same structural form. There exist two well recognized distributions which have this property: the Poisson distribution with unknown mean parameter, and the gamma distribution with known shape and unknown rate parameters (see Fink 1997) . We employ the Poisson likelihood as the gamma likelihood does not yield analytically tractable results. Furthermore, the Poisson distribution has many desirable properties when combined with a gamma prior that resemble those of the standard combination of normal likelihood and normal prior.
We assume that the …rm discloses signalS which is equal to the mean of Poisson distributed random variables with meanṼ . Furthermore, the underlying signals are independent conditional onṼ . In the appendix we show that the mean of these signals is a su¢ cient statistic for their individual realizations. We can view the number of signals as a measure of the precision ofS since the variance of the signals (conditional onṼ ) is decreas- 14 The comparative static with respect to 2 V in e¤ect increases b while increasing a at the same rate. Eqn. (9) indicates that this increases prices only through its impact on the variance uncertainty premium. ing in : V ar S ( ) jṼ = V ar
Applying results from Bayesian statistics, one can show thatṼ jS is gamma distributed. In the following lemma, we express the conditional mean and variance in terms of the prior mean and variance, the signal, and the precision parameter.
Lemma 1
The conditional mean and conditional variance of the variance distribution given the signalS are equal to:
As in the case of the normal prior and normal likelihood, Lemma 1 shows that the expected variance is linear in the signal and that the signal receives greater weight as precision increases. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient onS is equal to the regression coe¢ cient
Cov(Ṽ ;S) V ar(S)
. If the signal is equal to its prior mean, V , there is no updating on the mean, but the variance is reduced by
In a setting with normal distributions the conditional variance after receiving an information signal does not depend upon that signal's realization. However, Lemma 1 shows that the conditional uncertainty about the variance is not constant but, similar to the mean, is linearly increasing in the signal realization. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the distribution of the variance is constrained to be nonnegative. To demonstrate this point, consider what happens in the knife-edged case where investors receive a signalS = 0. As a zero mean has to imply a zero variance for a nonnegative distribution, all variance uncertainty disappears. Thus, low means tend to be associated with low variances for nonnegative distributions. 15 We will see that this feature results in di¤erences between the results for mean disclosure and our results for risk disclosure.
Since the expected value of S is given by V , it has to be the case that
In other words, the expected conditional variance is strictly lower than the unconditional variance and the di¤erence is increasing in the precision of the signals. As ! 1, the expected conditional variance approaches 0. Figure 2 depicts the variance distribution as the number of signals increases, given that the mean of these signals is equal to their prior mean. 16 Although not apparent from the diagram, all three distributions have the same mean; the skewness of the gamma distribution obscures this fact. The tighter variance distributions correspond to cash ‡ow distributions with less kurtosis.
Proposition 2 derives the …rm's price conditional on the risk disclosure. Note that the necessary condition from Proposition (1),
, is relaxed after the risk disclosure and 15 In the our model, there is both an increase in the amount of noise in the signal and in the assessed underlying variance distribution such that the conditional mean remains linear in the signal. 16 Setting the mean of the signals equal to their prior mean isolates the uncertainty reduction e¤ect of information from any e¤ect due to a change in the posterior expectation of the variance distribution. 
and ( ) =
To demonstrate the e¤ect of a disclosure on price, consider the price reaction to a signal that is equal to its prior mean. While the risk premium does not change (due to the constant expected variance), the variance premium is multiplied by a factor which is less than one and decreasing in . Intuitively, even when a risk disclosure has no mean e¤ect, it reduces the ex post uncertainty about the variance in proportion to its precision, and thus increases price. In the limit, as ! 1, the variance uncertainty premium disappears.
Next, consider the price reaction to a signal that deviates from the prior mean. Similar to the result for normal distributions, price responds linearly to the deviation of a signal from its prior mean. Furthermore, the strength of the linear response is increasing in the precision (it is easily checked that 0 ( ) > 0). However, note that for mean disclosures with normal distributions, the signal's realization impacts the mean, but has no e¤ect on the risk premium. In contrast, for risk disclosures the realization of the signal itself a¤ects both the risk premium and the variance uncertainty premium. To illustrate, we rewrite P S from Proposition (2) to absorb the term ( ) S E S into the risk and variance uncertainty premia:
Note thatS a¤ects both the risk premium and the variance premium through its impact on E Ṽ jS . This arises because the uncertainty over the variance is increasing in the signal's realization. Further, note that the price response to the signal ( ) is increasing in risk aversion (higher risk aversion increases the importance of changes in the expected variance) and increasing in the ratio of the prior variance to the prior mean
increases the signal to noise ratio ofS. That is, the total amount of uncertainty to be resolved divided by the expected noise in the signal,
. The expected noise in the signal, E V ar S jṼ , is increasing in V due to the correlation between mean and variance. Intuitively, when the expected cash ‡ow variance is high, we expect to receive a noisier signal. On the other hand, when 2 V is higher, there is more uncertainty to be resolved, that is, the prior precision is lower.
Cost of Capital E¤ects
The discussion of Proposition (2) suggests that there is a price response even when the signal merely con…rms the prior expectations. This implies that risk disclosure should have an e¤ect on the …rm's expected cost of capital. As an extension to the last section, we now examine the ex ante e¤ects of risk disclosure, i.e., the impact on the cost of capital. Following prior literature, we de…ne the cost of capital as the discount that is applied to price relative to expected cash ‡ows, that is, E [x] E (P j ), where is all information available to the market. Taking the expectation of price conditional on the signal, we …nd that:
The cost of capital is a decreasing function of since 0 ( ) < 0. Moreover, the e¤ect of on the cost of capital is increasing in risk aversion and increasing in the ratio of the prior variance to the prior mean of the variance distribution,
Intuitively, the value of reducing uncertainty over the variance is greater when the price responsiveness to the signal is larger.
As one would expect, E P S is decreasing in at a decreasing rate, such that as ! 1, the variance uncertainty premium disappears and expected price is exactly equal to the mean less a discount for the prior expectation of risk. Concavity of the price e¤ect in is a desirable attribute, as it suggests that …rms which act to maximize their expected price in general will not …nd it optimal to fully acquire and/or disclose risk information even if the cost of doing so is linear. Our results therefore imply that …rms acquire great bene…t from acquiring and disclosing at least some variance information. Moreover, our results provide a theoretical rationale for the regulatory e¤orts of the SEC and FASB if legal mandates provide a mechanism for …rms to commit to disclosure.
The following corollary summarizes the cost of capital e¤ects of risk disclosure.
Corollary 2 A …rm's cost of capital is decreasing at a decreasing rate in the precision of its disclosure. The e¤ect of on the cost of capital is increasing in the ratio
and increasing in risk aversion .
While our model captures disclosure about the uncertain variance of cash ‡ows, a related issue is disclosure with an uncertain precision in a setting with a constant cash ‡ow variance (as in Subramanyam, 1996) . A random disclosure precision implies that from the investors'
perspective there is uncertainty about the conditional cash ‡ow variance. Corollary 2 suggests that, ex ante, it is bene…cial for …rms to commit to a constant disclosure precision because it reduces the cost of capital.
The Interaction between Mean and Variance Disclosure
In this section, we consider whether …rms face trade-o¤s between disclosing mean information and disclosing variance information. First, consider the knife-edged case where a …rm discloses a perfect mean signal of its cash ‡ows. In this situation, there is no residual uncertainty about cash ‡ows such that there is no role for risk disclosure. This suggests that mean disclosure, even when it is not perfect, may act as a substitute for risk disclosures.
The obvious way to formally model this phenomenon is to assume that the …rm discloses a mean signalx +", where"jṼ " s N 0;Ṽ " . Unfortunately, there does not exist a well known conjugate prior for a normal distribution with a gamma distributed variance; instead, one would have to assume an inverse gamma distributed variance, which would lead to the nonexistence of a closed form for expected utility. 17 In order to solve this problem, we assume that the …rm can scale down its variance at a cost. While this abstracts away from statistical details, it captures the essence of mean disclosure. In particular, assume that a …rm jointly chooses a level of mean disclosure, !, and a level of variance disclosure, . For a given level of mean disclosure, ! 2 [0; 1], the …rm's cash ‡ows are distributed as:
whereṼ follows the same set of distributional assumptions that we made previously. Furthermore, assume there is a weakly convex, increasing cost for mean disclosure, c M (!), and a weakly convex, increasing cost function for variance disclosure, c V ( ). Finally, assume the …rm acts to maximize price. Then, the …rm solves:
Proposition 3 con…rms the intuition from the knife-edged case of full disclosure:
Proposition 3 Mean and variance disclosure are substitutes in the following sense: mean disclosure ! increases when variance disclosure becomes more costly, and variance disclosure 17 It is possible to model a disclosure that contains pure mean information by assuming that cash ‡ows are equal to an uncertain mean term plus an uncertain variance term, and letting the disclosure equal the uncertain mean term plus noise. Then, mean disclosure does not contain any information on the variance and there is no interaction between mean and variance disclosure. Here, we consider the more realistic case where mean disclosure is a noisy realization of cash ‡ows that contains variance information as well.
increases when mean disclosure becomes more costly.
In our model, mean disclosure reveals some of the uncertainty over the variance. Thus, the bene…ts to variance disclosure are much greater when it is very costly for the …rm to generate or disclose mean information. By the same reasoning, variance disclosure reduces the bene…t to mean disclosure, and mean disclosure is more pro…table when variance disclosure is costly.
Proposition 3 suggests that legal mandates which require …rms to disclose more variance information lead to a reduction in mean disclosure. Furthermore, after taking costs into consideration, regulation can only harm the …rm's price.
Corollary 3 Suppose that a regulator sets the mandatory level of variance disclosure equal to R . If R is greater than the …rm's optimal choice in the absence of disclosure, , then the …rm will respond by reducing mean disclosure.
Corollary 3 suggests that regulatory actions trade o¤ several costs and bene…ts. Regulations may give …rms a mechanism to commit to providing disclosure ex ante, but they may force …rms away from their optimal levels of mean and variance disclosure.
Sequential Information Acquisition
Equation (10) shows that the conditional variance in our model is increasing in the value of the disclosed signal, S. This is a consequence of the correlation between mean and variance for non-normal distributions. Intuitively, the uncertainty about the underlying variance distribution is perceived to be higher when the mean is higher. As a result, the higher the signal investors receive, the greater their residual uncertainty. This is in contrast to the standard result for normal distributions in which the conditional variance is constant; in that case, any signal realization leaves the same amount of residual uncertainty. This implies that if …rms disclose preliminary information that suggests risks are high, they will have strong incentives to disclose further information regarding their risks.
To formally model a …rm's incentives to learn and disclose information, we develop a model where a …rm sequentially acquires information and can choose whether to continue or stop its information acquisition. Speci…cally, we assume that the …rm can pay a cost k to receive a variance signal s 1 . After receiving the …rst signal, the …rm chooses whether or not to acquire an additional signal at an additional cost k. The …rm can then pay yet another k to receive a third signal, and so on. Any information the …rm gathers must be disclosed truthfully. The di¤erence between these assumptions and our previous assumptions is that the …rm observes the realization of the th signal before choosing whether to disclose the ( + 1) th signal. The …rm can acquire at most T signals where T is an arbitrarily large integer. Our setup is very similar to the classic statistical problem of sequential sampling (see DeGroot 1970, ch. 12) where the decision problem is bounded at time T .
In the standard disclosure model with normal distributions, this change of assumption would have no impact on the results. To see this, consider the set up of our model with no uncertainty over the variance of cash ‡ows, and consider the sequential collection of mean signalsm . In particular, letm =x +" where" s N (0; ), Cov (" i ;" j ) = 0 8i; j, and Cov (" ;x) = 0. LetM be the mean of the …rst signals, and let V equal the known variance of cash ‡ows. Then, after collecting 1 signals with meanM 1 , the expected bene…t from receiving another signal is:
Since the bene…t is not a function ofM 1 ; the decision to acquire an additional signal never depends on signal realizations. Thus, whether the …rm is able to observe signal realizations prior to choosing its optimal level of information acquisition is irrelevant.
Returning to the setting of risk disclosure, suppose that a …rm receives a low variance, signal. Then, due to correlation between mean and variance, residual uncertainty is low, and the …rm has a reduced incentive to learn an additional signal. Additionally, when choosing whether to acquire an additional signal, the …rm must take into account that there exists an option value to continuing. An option value arises since if the signal in the next period is su¢ ciently high, the …rm will …nd it optimal to acquire yet another signal. Since the continuation decision is a function of the random signal realizations, the number of signals a …rm acquires before stopping, which we refer to as&; is a random variable.
Let~ be the sum of the …rst signals received. In the appendix we show that the immediate bene…ts to learning an additional signal after acquiring signals, E P ~ +1 j~ P ~ , can be written as~ f ( ) for a positive function f ( ) with f 0 ( ) < 0. Furthermore, let C be the event such that the …rm continues in period . The event C T 1 is equivalent tõ
; 1). The continuation value in period T 2, the …rst period in which there exists a real option, thus takes the following form:
Clearly, the immediate bene…t~ T 2 f (T 2) increases in~ T 2 . In the appendix, we show a higher signal~ T 2 increases the distribution of~ T 1 in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance, and that both the probability of continuing next period and the expected bene…t to continuing are increasing in~ T 1 . Together, these results imply that the continuation value also increases in~ T 2 . Continuing via backwards induction, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The …rm continues in any given period if the sum of the signals it has learned and disclosed thus far,~ , belongs to an interval of the form [c ; 1). This implies that after receiving high variance news, the …rm is more likely to continue acquiring and disclosing additional signals. When the underlying varianceṼ is higher, the expected number of signals disclosed, E &jṼ , is greater.
Proposition 4 suggests that empirically, we should observe that …rms with high variances disclose more information on their risk. Furthermore, it predicts that increased risk disclosures follow economy-wide increases in average risk such as the 2008 …nancial crisis. This result is distinct from our previous …nding that 2 V increased the impact of disclosure on prices; here we …nd that the true variance, in addition to the degree of variance uncertainty, impacts the amount of variance information a …rm discloses.
As discussed above, in a setting with known cash ‡ow variance but uncertain precision of disclosure (Subramanyam, 1996) leads to an uncertain conditional cash ‡ow variance. The results of this section suggest that in such a setting, investors have an increased incentive to acquire information. In equilibrium, this would suggest a relatively constant conditional variance. For example, a conservative disclosure policy that provides more precise information about a …rm's downside risk may lead to increased incentives to acquire information about a …rm's upside potential.
Multiple Asset Extension
In this section, we consider an extension of our model to a multi-asset setting. Our single asset model leaves open the question of whether risk disclosures impact the cost of capital when investors hold diversi…ed portfolios. Furthermore, we would like to address whether there exist positive externalities to risk disclosure. In order to address these questions, we develop a factor model where both idiosyncratic and systematic variances are unknown.
Assume that there are N …rms in the economy with a per capita supply of 1 N whose cash ‡owsx i are equal to a common factor loading plus idiosyncratic noise, i.e.,x i = iF +" i whereF and" i are independent. Furthermore, assume that both the common factor and the idiosyncratic components of cash ‡ows have variance uncertainty:F jṼ F s N F ;Ṽ F and" i jṼ i s N " i ;Ṽ i whereṼ F s Gamma
. Finally, assume that the uncertain variance distributions are independent. Without loss of generality, we scale the factor such that the average beta is one:
By assuming that the per capita supply of each asset is equal to 1 N , the total risk in the economy remains constant when we vary the number of …rms in the economy. There are two possible interpretations of this assumption. First, we could argue that as the economy grows, the numerator of per capita supply shrinks. In this case, we are letting each …rm become an arbitrarily small portion of the economy while keeping the total size of the economy the same. An alternative interpretation is that the investor base grows with the economy, and hence the per capita supply decreases because the denominator grows (see Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007 for an in depth discussion of this issue). In either case, in the limit, each individual investor holds an arbitrarily small amount of any given asset.
Then, as a baseline, the price of …rm k in the standard case when there is no variance uncertainty, that is,Ṽ = V k with certainty, equals:
We de…ne the risk premium associated with the systematic component as RP S and RP I ! 0, i.e., the idiosyncratic risk premium vanishes and the systematic risk premium converges to risk aversion times the covariance of the …rm's cash ‡ows with the common factor. Next, we perform an analysis similar to the single asset case to derive prices under variance uncertainty.
Proposition 5 Assume that
18 Then, the price of the k th asset is equal to the mean less the systematic and idiosyncratic risk premia less systematic and 18 These conditions mirror the condition from the single asset case and imply that investors are willing to hold shares at any …nite price.
idiosyncratic variance uncertainty premia:
In essence, the systematic and idiosyncratic components of cash ‡ows are valued separately and price is equal to the sum of their values. Thus, there exist variance uncertainty premia for both components. When k > 0; as in the single asset case, the systematic variance uncertainty premium is increasing in
, ambiguous with respect to V F ; but decreasing for …rst order stochastic dominant shifts in the factor variance. As
converges to the baseline price with no variance uncertainty. Prices continue to be quadratic in the factor loading. While the factor loading leads to a fourth order e¤ect on variance uncertainty, the e¤ect on price is only linear due to the hedgeability of systematic variance uncertainty. For k < 0, all of the comparative statics are reversed, since the …rm serves as a hedge.
The portion of the variance uncertainty premium associated with idiosyncratic risk is identical to that in the single asset case if the endowment had been , is decreasing in location shifts in the idiosyncratic or systematic variances, and is decreasing in the risk aversion . For k < 0, the comparative statics on the systematic component are reversed.
Next, consider what happens as the number of assets in the economy approaches in…nity.
Recall that as supply per capita equals 1 N , the total risk in the economy is constant in N .
Thus, when we let N ! 1 in (23), the idiosyncratic component vanishes, and price becomes:
Similar to a setting with known variance, all idiosyncratic risk factors are not priced. Furthermore, investors are willing to pay a premium for …rms whose cash ‡ows are negatively correlated with the market portfolio.
Systematic and Idiosyncratic Disclosure
Equation (26) implies that, in a large economy, idiosyncratic disclosure will have no impact on the cost of capital. Only disclosure that contains information on the systematic factor will a¤ect the cost of capital. For demonstration purposes, suppose that each …rm issues a unique signal that can be broken down into two components, a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Mathematically, we assume this implies that the …rm discloses two signals of the sort we discussed in the single asset case:
where the s jIk 's and s jF k 's are mutually independent conditional onṼ k andṼ F . 19 Let S I = S 1I ; :::;S N I be the vector of …rms'idiosyncratic signals andS F = S 1F ; :::;S N F be 19 Mathematically, modeling variance disclosure by multiple …rms in our setup is not straightforward since the systematic components of …rms'disclosures likely overlap. In particular, multiple …rms may aggregate signals that contain the sames ik . Nevertheless, it is intuitive that …rms' information disclosures can be jointly used to assess the uncertain variance of the factor, and thus we assume that investors can tease apart the novel information in a …rm's disclosures. the vector of …rms systematic signals. Then, as N ! 1, the k th …rm's price conditional on the signals is equal to:
. This implies the cost of capital is equal to:
The market uses a weighted average S F = ( 0 1)
F of the …rms'signals when updating on the factor variance, and takes into account the total precision of all disclosures, 0 1. The cost of capital is decreasing in iF , but idiosyncratic disclosure ik plays no role. As long as disclosure contains some information regarding the common factor, the results from all of our single asset models will continue to hold in an economy with multiple assets.
Similar to the results found by Admati and P ‡eiderer (2000) for mean disclosure, risk disclosure that has a systematic component generates a positive externality in that it reduces uncertainty for all …rms in the economy and reduces the aggregate cost of capital. This provides another potential rationale for the attention regulatory authorities have been giving to mandated risk disclosures.
Conclusion
In recent years, the SEC and FASB have taken action to increase …rms' risk disclosure.
However, the theoretical literature on disclosure has o¤ered sparse evidence on the e¤ect of risk disclosure on prices. In particular, it has either assumed away pricing of variance uncertainty, or has focused on the strategic disclosure setting with perfect disclosure of variance uncertainty. In this paper, we address how risk disclosure is priced from an ex ante point of view, which allows us to highlight several costs and bene…ts of mandated risk disclosure.
We begin by deriving prices when investors have negative exponential utility and cash ‡ows are normal conditional on a gamma distributed variance. We show that investors penalize …rms with variance uncertainty. We next consider how an ex ante commitment to risk disclosure can a¤ect a …rm's cost of capital. Analogous to the standard result for mean-based disclosure, risk disclosure reduces investors perceived riskiness of the variance distribution. This leads to a decrease in the cost of capital. Technically, this results from that fact that variance uncertainty implies that the cash ‡ow distribution exhibits positive excess kurtosis and that investors with a negative exponential utility are kurtosis-averse (that is, they are "temperate"). Risk disclosure reduces the excess kurtosis and, thus, increases expected price.
We next model a …rm's joint choice of the precisions of mean and risk disclosures. We …nd mean disclosure and risk disclosure are substitutes, and thus, mandated increases in risk disclosure can lead to decreases in mean disclosure. To further explore the di¤erences between mean and risk disclosure, we endogenize the acquisition of information by the …rm, and show that …rms tend to acquire and disclose more information after receiving high variance signals.
This arises due to the correlation between mean and variance for non-negative distributions.
Finally, we show that the results of mean disclosure in a multi-asset environment carry over to risk disclosure.
While our model highlights several potential costs and bene…ts of regulating risk disclosure, it is but a …rst step toward developing regulatory recommendations. It should be clear from our model that many of the same trade-o¤s that have been highlighted for mean disclosure (see, for example, Beyer et al. 2010 ) hold for risk disclosure, and that regulators must take into consideration the multitude of e¤ects that mandated disclosure may have.
Furthermore, a notable contribution of our paper is that it provides a set of tools for examining risk disclosure that can be applied to other research settings. In particular,
we have derived expected utility given negative exponential utility functions with a well known distribution over the variance. This could be applied to study a setting in which investors have private information. We have also abstracted completely from agency issues by assuming the …rm exogenously makes decisions to maximize prices. Future research could extend our results on variance uncertainty to study agency problems.
Unfortunately, our study shows that the expected utility of an investor with a negative exponential utility is relatively complex. This naturally limits the ability to answer several questions with our setting. However, future research could be based on a mean-variancekurtosis utility function and a state contingent variance with a binary state. 20 Consistent with our results, one can show that variance uncertainty increases kurtosis more generally. For simplicity, we …rst …nd price for a gamma distribution parameterized by shape and scale, a and b. We then convert this to price for a gamma characterized by V and 2 V by using
2Ṽ
where the simpli…cations follow from the law of iterated expectations and the MGF of a normal distribution. After applying a monotone transformation, this is equal to:
Solving for the latter term, we …nd:
Note that the integral of the gamma PDF only exists for b >
. Otherwise, the integral is equal to negative in…nity. We conjecture an equilibrium where b > Each investor's …rst order condition is:
Again, in equilibrium, D = 1 since all investors are homogeneous. This implies
, we get:
Proof of Corollary 1:
The result that prices are decreasing in 2 V and can easily be seen by taking the respective derivatives of (4). The derivative with respect to V is equal to:
which has the same sign as V
2
V : Finally, to show that prices uniformly decrease in a location shift in the variance; note that, repeating the analysis for the proof of Proposition 1 yields:
. (37) such that investor's FOC is:
which implies
Proof of Lemma 1:
The well known result from Bayesian statistics is couched in terms of the shape and scale 
We next show that the mean of the signals is a su¢ cient statistic for their individual real-izations by using the Fisher-Neyman factorization theorem:
f (s 1 ; :::; s ; V ) = f (s 1 ; :::; s jV ) f (V ) (41)
Proving the lemma is simply a matter of using these results and performing algebraic manipulations.
Note that:
Hence, we can alternatively write:
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proving the proposition is simply a matter of plugging the results from the lemma into (4):
Proof of Proposition 3:
De…ne g (!; ) to be the maximand in eqn. (19) . It is easily checked that the price component of this expression is concave in ! and . Combining this with the assumption that the cost functions are weakly convex, the maximization problem has a unique solution (! ; ).
Consider an increase in the cost function for risk disclosure, c ( ) + k V , and an increase in the cost function for mean disclosure, c M ($) + k M $. In the interesting case that this solution is interior, applying the implicit function theorem we …nd:
It can be shown that
Proof of Corollary 3:
The corollary is easily shown by noting that for R > ; ! now solves @g @! = R = 0 rather than @g @! = = 0; using @g(!; ) @ @! < 0 implies this leads to a lower optimum.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We start by establishing two useful lemmas. Let~ be the sum of all signals received up until the th signal.
Lemma 2 The immediate bene…t to acquiring an additional signal, E P ~ +1 j~ P ~ takes the form~ f ( ) where f ( ) > 0 and f 0 ( ) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The …rm chooses to learn an additional signals +1 when its expectation of the change in price given the additional signal is greater than the cost of acquiring an additional signal:
Writing out the left hand side and applying the law of iterated expectations, we …nd:
where we used the fact that
We next prove the following lemma which will be used several times.
Lemma 3 An increase in~ 1 increases the distribution of~ j~ 1 in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance.
Proof of Lemma 3:
De…ne F j~ 1 to be the CDF of the th signals conditional on the sum of the …rst 1 signals. We start by showing
Recall the following general result: if some random variablex leads to an increase in the conditional distribution f ( jx) in the sense of FSD, and u 0 < 0; then
This can be shown using integration by parts. Furthermore, recall that~ 1 increases the distribution ofṼ in the sense of FSD, and that
@ @Ṽ
Pr s < cjṼ < 0. This implies @ @~ 1 F j~ 1 < 0. Combining these results:
Using the chain rule,
To simplify notation, call the event of continuing in period , C : Our strategy in proving the proposition is as follows. We start by considering the last period with the option to learn, T 1. We show that the value to learning additional information is of the form T 1 f (T 1) k; and thus is increasing in~ T 1 : We then look at the previous period, and
show that the expected bene…t to learning is equal to~ T 2 f (T 2) + OptVal ~ T 1 k:
We show that the option value has the property that it is increasing in~ T 1 : This process can then be repeated iteratively.
Consider terminal period T 1. The value to continuing is:
There is clearly no option value, as the next period is the terminal period. In period T 2; the …rm's continuation value is:
where OptV al T 2;~ T 2 = Pr C T 1 j~ T 2 E P ~ T P ~ T 1 kjC T 1 ;~ T 2 .
This can be seen by adding and subtracting Pr C T 1 j~ T 2 E P ~ T 1 P T 2 kjC T 1 ;~ T 2 and simplifying.
The option value is nonnegative since the …rm would never choose to continue unless doing so yielded positive returns in expectation. We next show that option value is increasing iñ T 2 : Clearly, Pr C T 1 j~ T 2 is increasing in~ T 2 . Furthermore, by the smoothing law:
Next, we show that this expectation is increasing in~ T 2 . The argument is nontrivial since FSD is not a su¢ cient condition for truncated expectations to be increasing (see, e.g., Shaked
and Shanthikumar (2006)).
Lemma 4 @ @~ T 2 E ~ T 1 j~ T 1 c;~ T 2 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Note that E ~ T 1 j~ T 1 c;~ T 2 = E E ~ T 1 j~ T 1 c;~ T 2 ;Ṽ j~ T 1 c;~ T 2 E h h ~ T 2 ;Ṽ j~ T 1 c;~ T 2 i , where h ~ T 2 ;Ṽ = E ~ T 1 j~ T 1 c;~ T 2 ;Ṽ .
We …rst show that h ~ T 2 ;Ṽ is increasing in~ T 2 andṼ . Combining this with the fact that~ T 2 shifts the distribution ofṼ in the sense of FSD and using an integration by parts argument as was done previously, we will have proved the result.
Note thatṼ and~ T 2 shift the distribution of~ T 1 j~ T 2 ;Ṽ upwards in the sense of monotone likelihood ratio dominance. To see this, suppose t 1 > 0 t 1 . For MLR dominance to hold, we must show the following increases in V and t 2 :
Pr ( t 1 j t 2 ; V ) Pr
This is clearly increasing in V; and is increasing in t 2 since ( 
Finalizing the proof of Proposition 4:
Thus, we have that the option value is increasing in~ T 2 , and hence the continuation value in time T 2 is increasing in~ T 2 . Backing up one more step to show how the inductive argument would continue, consider the continuation value at time T 3. This is given by:
where OptV al (T 3) = Pr C T 2 j~ T 3 E ContV al T 2 j~ T 3 (64) = Pr C T 2 j~ T 3 E ~ T 2 f (T 2) + Pr C T 1 j~ T 2 ContV al T 1 j~ T 3 .
We know that @ @~ T 3 Pr C T 2 j~ T 3 > 0. In addition,
ContV al ~ T 2 > 0; combined with the …rst lemma that says increases in~ T 3 increase the distribution of~ T 2 in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance, this implies that an increase in~ T 3 increases the expected continuation value. Continuing by induction, this shows that the continuation value in any period is increasing in~ , and thus, the …rm continues for values of~ 2 [c ; 1)
for some c 0.
Finally, we show that E &jṼ is increasing inṼ : Note that: Pr s i jṼ > 0: This implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 5:
We prove the proposition in terms of a i and b i and then transform the result into the parameterization in terms of V and 2 V . The proof is very similar to the case for a single asset. First, apply the MGF of a normal distribution, we get:
. (68) Applying monotone transformations, and then using the MGF of the gamma distribution, we …nd:
Note that, as in the single asset case, a conjecture and verify approach and the assumption that 
In equilibrium, we know that all demands are 1 N . Plugging this in and solving, we get
, and b F = V F 2 V F , and performing algebraic manipulations, we …nd:
It can be shown that a …rst order stochastic dominant shift inṼ F reduces the price of all …rms by adding k F > 0 toṼ F as was done in the proof of Proposition 1.
